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Peterson's paper "International Farm Prices and
the Social Cost of Cheap Food Policies" is a force-
ful expression of what is becoming a general belief
in the profession, that government policies have
reduced agricultural production in less developed
countries (LDCs). Schultz might be said to be the
author of the argument, of which recent examples
are Bale and Lutz and some items in their bibliog-
raphy. Policy implications are that less developed
countries could raise agricultural production by im-
proving domestic agricultural incentives, especially
output prices.
I argue in this comment that this view, at least as
it is quantified in Peterson's paper, can be seriously
misleading. I illustrate the point by referring to
some countries from sub-Saharan Africa. It is mis-
leading because (a) it is based on a misinterpreta-
tion of the price data, (b) it obscures the market
structures of many countries, (c) it groups African
countries with others where agricultural supply
functions are probably more price elastic, and (d) it
obscures the role of foreign trade.
The Model of Cheap Food Policies
Peterson expressed commodity prices (crops and
livestock) in wheat-equivalents deflated by fer-
tilizer prices to make them independent of ex-
change rates. In his figure 1, Po is the official pro-
ducer price ("the prices received by farmers"), P2
is the consumer price corresponding to the quantity
Qo supplied at Po, and P t is the market-clearing
price.
Using data from fifty-three developed countries
and LDCs, Peterson estimated a supply function
with price, technology, and weather variables and
found price elasticities between 1.25 and 1.66.
Choosing an average price elasticity of supply of
1.27 and one of demand of -1.0, Peterson solved
for the market-clearing price of P, and quantity Qt.
In equilibrium, net social income would increase by
the shaded triangle in his figure 1. The value of that
triangle as a percentage of 1969national income for
the eight African countries in Peterson's sample
ranged from 2.5% to 28.9% with a mean of 11.4%.
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Critique of the Model
The principal objection to the model is that it uses
official FAO (1975) producer prices. It assumes
those prices determined supply so as to create a gap
between the producer price (Po in Peterson's figure
1) and the consumer price (P 2 ) in excess of market-
ing costs. If the gap (p2 - Po) does not exist or if it
corresponds to real marketing costs, then there is
no justification for the model's social cost calcula-
tions. There is good evidence that official producer
prices are ignored in African countries, that prices
actually received by farmers are higher than
official, and that, where a gap exists, it reflects real
marketing costs (Jones, CRED). It is also true that
official producer prices are usually intended to be
minimum prices and that little effort, if any, is made
to restrict market prices to these minima.
A second objection is that the proclamation of
official prices is insufficient to control prices below
market-clearing levels. There must be an effective
monopsony to buy crops at less than market-
clearing levels;' Without monopsony, the competi-
tive behavior of traders will equilibrate supply and
demand prices, reducing the government's market
share and eliminating the rent shown as Qo*(P 2 -
Po) in Peterson's figure 1. While many African gov-
ernments do have controls on domestic trade, they
buy only a small share of output (CRED and the
country studies in Pearson, Stryker, Humphreys).
If Peterson is correct about economic rent, then
one should find price gaps for major commodities in
actual data series roughly equal to those in his
model. Table 1 shows values of P2/Po calculated
from his model and from market prices for millet in
three countries of Peterson's sample and for rice in
Senegal. Millet is a major crop in each country, and
rice is a major import in Senegal. This provides a
good test of the model. Niger, Upper Volta, and
Senegal were fourth, ninth, and twelfth among
twenty-six LDCs in social costs relative to national
income in Peterson's model. Hence, they should be
among the greatest beneficiaries of policy reforms.
Except for Senegalese millet, the actual gaps are
much smaller than those predicted by the model.
This suggests that the official monopsonies were
ineffective. It is also true that the gaps might not
contain any rent at all. Hence, the relatively small
I Examples might be irrigation projects where levies compel
farmers to market output at prices below market levels. Even this
structure, in which official monopsony is effective, must provide
some incentive to the producer or he would leave the project.
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Table 1. Model Price Gaps and Actual Price
Gaps, 1968-70
Model" Actual" Ratio of Model
P2/PO P2/PO to Actual
(1) (2) (1)/(2)
Niger
Millet 7.36 1.88 (1.63)C 3.91 (4.52)C
Senegal
Millet 1.94 1.82 (1.58) 1.07 (1.23)
Rice 1.94 1.46 (1.27) 1.33 (1.53)
Upper Volta
Millet 3.02 1.92 (1.67) 1.57 (1.81)
Note: The actual values of Po for each of the three countries are
taken from United Nations 1975. the same source used by Peter-
son, for the period 1968-70. For Niger, 12 Communaute Finan-
ciere Af~caine francs (FCFA) per kilogram; for rice in Senegal,
paddy pnces are converted to rice prices by dividing by a milling
ratio of 0.65, and average rice producer price for 1968-70 was 34.9
FCFA/kg; for millet in Senegal average producer price for 1968-70
was 17.7FCFAlkg; for Upper Volta millet, average producer price
for 1968-70 was 14 FCFA/kg.
a Model values of P2 for each country were calculated from
quan~ty change data in column 2 of table 4 in Peterson, from price
data 10 table 1 of Peterson, the benchmark price of $58.80/metric
ton of wheat-equivalent as Ph the price elasticity ofsupply of 1.27,
and the demand price elasticity of -1.0.
b Actual values ofF2 for millet in Niger are for the years 1967,
1968, and 1971 (values for 1969 and 1970 are lost) from data in
CRED for the capital city of Niamey; the value used was 22.6
FCFA/kg, which was the annual average retail price in the three
years. Actual values of P2 for millet in Senegal for years 1968-70
were 32.3 FCFAlkg; data source is Tuluy. Actual values of P2 for
rice in Senegal for years 1968-70 are taken from Tuluy for the
capital city of Dakar; the annual average for 1968-70 was 50.8
FCFAlkg. Actual values of millet for years 1968-70 for Upper
Volta are annual averages from capital city of Ouagadougou; value
was 26.9 FCFA/kg.
C Values in parentheses are calculated assuming that there is a 15%
marketing cost applied to Po, in order to reflect the real social costs
of delivering farm products to consumers. This 15%is a conserva-
tive estimate of the share of marketing costs in producer prices in
these countries.
gaps observed are not grounds to infer that public
price policies prevent markets from clearing.
Government price controls can be effective for
export crops. Taxes can impose a gap between pro-
ducer price (marginal cost) and foreign price (aver-
age revenue), but Peterson's model denies the rele-
~ance of export taxes. Such taxes are particularly
Important for African tropical crops with little
domestic demand and individually inelastic foreign
demand. In countries such as Senegal (groundnut
oil), Sudan (groundnuts and cotton), Ivory Coast
and Ghana (cocoa), export taxes probably do affect
the world price. Peterson's model, which sets mar-
ginal cost equal to average revenue, undervalues
the contribution of such taxes to exporters' welfare.
Another objection is that world prices are ir-
relevant in countries removed from world markets
by transport costs. Consider a market in which
transport costs separate import (CIF) prices from
export (FOB) prices by the relation
Pcil = Pl ab + k,
Amer. J. Agr. Econ.
where k is transport costs between the FOB and
CIF market points. If such markets clear domesti-
cally above FOB prices and below CIF prices,
international trade does not occur without interven-
tion. The use of FOB or CIF prices as welfare
indicators is therefore incorrect.
Such markets exist for crops in Africa (Tuluy;
Humphreys and Pearson). In addition, data from
the International Livestock Center for Africa
(ILCA) illustrate the case of meat markets. In the
late 1960s, FOB meat prices in interior West Afri-
can countries were $0.30 to $0.40 per kilogram, and
about $0.70 in the export markets (Australia or
Argentina). The interior West African countries
were exporting meat to terminal markets on the
West African coast at Cl F prices of $0.80 to $1.00.
Because of transport costs, interior markets cleared
at prices well below world export prices. Raising
prices in the interior to world export levels would
have created excess supply in the interior. Using
world export prices as a welfare indicator is again
incorrect.
The model also overestimates African price elas-
ticities of supply. A review of such elasticities in
African smallholder agriculture, the dominant type,
shows few single-crop elasticities as high as Peter-
son's aggregate elasticity. The single-crop average
is about 0.7 (Helleiner). The literature also suggests
that response to price is greater where irrigation
and modern varieties are more common (Scandizzo
and Bruce). The share of irrigated area in arable
area in the eight African countries was 1.0% in
1969, compared to 12.0% in the other nineteen
countries of Peterson's sample (United Nations
1980).
Though Peterson's model does not consider for-
eign trade, one of his more important conclusions
is: "Indeed one might go so far as to say that if farm
prices in the LDCs were to approach world market
levels, these countries likely would become sub-
stantial exporters of agricultural products" (pp.
18-19). African countries imported large quantities
of food in the 1960s and 1970s. This is excluded
from Peterson's market structure and contradicts
his empirical results.
Consider a market with foreign trade. Peterson's
figure 1 can be imagined to present such a market
with international price of Pl' If governments im-
pose Po on producers, importers would exploit the
gap (P2 - PI) and import the quantity (QI - Qo),
lowering the consumer price to Pl' Without trade
controls [such as a ban on imports or a specific
tariff of (P2 - PI)], only the lower part of the
shaded triangle can be counted among the social
costs of cheap food policies.
The model is also politically unrealistic. Why
would governments tax producers and consumers,
so that both are worse off in Peterson's model than
in the equilibrium market? It might be more reason-
able to assume a market in which imports (Q2 - Qo)
are subsidized at Po in figure 1. Producers are worse
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Figure 1. The social cost of cheap food policies
(from Peterson)
off than in Peterson's equilibrium market where
they sell QI at Ph but consumers are better off than
if they consume QI at Pl' If imports (Q2 - Qo) are
subsidized, producer's income is equal to that in
Peterson's disequilibrium market because they sell
Qo at Po, but consumers are better off because they
consume Q2 at Po, not Qo at P2.
Governments careful of consumers' interests
might find import subsidies a rational policy. While
such subsidies reduce producer income and in-
crease imports, the net income effects of removing
the subsidies and allowing markets to clear at price
PI would be different from those in Peterson's
model. In Peterson's model the shaded triangle of
figure 1 is a cost of cheap food policies. The triangle
ABC in figure 1 here is a gain from another type of
cheap food policy, however. It is not a net gain,
which would have to include the costs of taxes used
to pay the import subsidy (PI - Po). The difference
between Peterson's model and the subsidized im-
ports model in figure 1 is that no one gains in Peter-
son's model and hence no one would support the
policy, but consumers would support the cheap
food policy of subsidized imports.
Conclusions
The evidence has recently become strong that ag-
ricultural goods are undervalued in many LDCs.
While there is uncertainty about the income gains
from policy reforms (because of uncertainty about
the price elasticities), such gains probably would be
positive. Most of this evidence is from Asia and
Latin America, however, not from Africa.
Comment 825
Detailed studies in Africa show mixed results
(CRED; Pearson, Stryker, Humphreys) and sug-
gest that models using official prices and/or world
prices are inapplicable in some markets. Peterson's
model, based on official producer prices and on a
simplified world price, gives results inconsistent
with prices in three of four African markets. This
suggests that Peterson's model exaggerates gains
from price reforms in those countries. The model
also fails to consider the effects of imports on the
welfare implications of cheap food policies. Finally,
his model assumes an irrational political economy
in which cheap food policies benefit no one-both
producers and consumers would lose from such
policies.
While this comment produces evidence from a
small number of countries, it should apply to most
LDCs. Further research on price distortions will
have a high return, but only if one considers differ-
ent market structures and the distributions of gains
among classes of producers and consumers.
[Received July 1982; revision accepted
April 1983.]
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